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Protection Of The Consumer
Interests And The Credit
Rating Industry
The California Legislature, by enacting the Consumer Credit Re-
porting Act, has declared that consumers are entitled to minimum
due process rights when denied credit as a result of a credit report.
In reviewing the factors leading to the need for this legislation this
comment discusses the major abuses that are most frequently lev-
eled against the credit rating industry and the traditional consumer
remedies that have sometimes been effective. Will this legislation
provide the appropriate protection for the consumer when his
rights are abused? Though cognizant of the important value of
this Act, the comment points out that some major omissions may
have severely reduced the protection the Act might have provided
for the consumer. In conclusion, specific recommendations for
amending the Act are discussed.
The credit rating industry has, in recent years, come under attack
with allegations that the members of this industry in one way or an-
other have abused the rights of consumers. In turn the industry has
been the subject of consideration by legislative investigating commit-
tees resulting in the introduction of several proposals for governmental
regulation." Though these proposals vary from narrow to all-encom-
passing attempts at regulation, they all imply one central theme-the
consumer has rights that may be subject to infringement by reports of
credit standing and at present these rights are not adequately protected.
Background
The best starting point is to review the important facts of the credit
rating industry now of public knowledge. In 1966, a proposal origi-
1. California legislation: Assembly Bills 1021, 1081, 1238, Senate Bills 501,
674, 1968 Regular Session; Assembly Bills 985, 1368, 1768, Senate Bills 762, 1142,
1969 Regular Session; A.B. 149, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1349; Assembly Bills 799, 2367,
1970 Regular Session. U.S. Congress: S. REP. No. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 31,
1969); H. 16340, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 5, 1970).
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nated from the executive branch of the federal government that a com-
puterized data bank be established on a national level. The announced
objective of this centralized data bank was to consolidate all known
personal information on every U.S. citizen.2 Many Congressmen felt
this proposal had overtones of Orwell's "1984" and the idea was quickly
abandoned.' However, prior to the demise of the proposal some leg-
islative inquiries were conducted. As a result, the enormous size of
the credit rating industry was brought to the attention of Congress. 4
This awareness motivated several Congressional committees to shift their
focus of study from the feasibility of a centralized computer bank to an
inquiry into the credit rating industry itself.5
The Congressional studies uncovered some astonishing figures." For
example, as of September, 1967, national consumer credit totaled
$95.886 billion.7 This figure alone might have little meaning but it is
phenomenal when one learns that this figure is over seventeen times as
large as it was in 1945, and the growth of consumer credit since 1945
has been at a rate of four and one half times the growth rate of our
national economy.8 Statistics for the credit rating industry are no less
amazing. The largest individual organization, Retail Credit Company
of Atlanta, Georgia, has 1800 offices in the United States and Canada.
As of January, 1969, Retail Credit was reported to have had credit files
on 45 million individuals.9 The second largest individual credit rating
organization is Credit Data Corporation. This is a California based
corporation whose operations are almost totally computerized. 10 Credit
Data has files on 27 million persons and they are reported to be adding
one half million new persons per month.11 The largest amalgamation
is Associated Credit Bureaus of America which combines over 2200
2. Report on Credit and Personnel Reporting Practices in California, submitted
to Governor Ronald Reagan of California on January 19, 1970. 115 CONG. REc. S1163(Jan. 31, 1969).
3. 115 CONG. REc. S1163 (Jan. 31, 1969).
4. See note 2 supra, and 1968 U.S. CODF CONG. & AD. NEws 1965, 66.
5. Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 16, 1968).
6. 114 CONG. REC. S10029 (Aug. 2, 1968); Report on Credit and Personnel
Reporting Practices in California, submitted to Governor Ronald Reagan of California
on January 19, 1970.
7. 114 CONG. Rnc. S10029 (Aug. 2, 1968).
8. 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1965-66.
9. See Sesser, Big Brother Keeps Tabs on Insurance Buyers, N.w REPULIC 11
(April 27, 1968).
10. A.C.B.'s (Associated Credit Bureaus of America) computer system, when im-
plemented, will differ from Credit Data Corporation's mainly in accessibility. Credit
Data has several offices nationwide that use its computerized information, but A.C.B.
has over 2200 affiliated offices.
11. Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 227 (1969). [Herein-
after cited as Hearings].
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credit rating agencies serving 400,000 credit grantors in 36,000 com-
munities. 12 The stated purpose of this association is to provide an inter-
locking exchange of information and thereby expedite the granting of
credit.13 Hence, each of these 400,000 credit grantors can obtain the
information possessed by any other credit grantor simply by asking.
Credit Report Profile
The information contained in an average credit rating report will
vary according to the purpose for which the original rating was made.
There are three general reasons for the initiation of a credit rating re-
port: retail credit, personnel selection, and insurance.' 4 Retail credit
ratings usually contain a person's address, family status, place of em-
ployment, approximate salary, credit history, where the applicant has
charge accounts and what his payment record has been. In addition,
most banks will usually divulge to credit bureaus the approximate size
of a customer's checking account and, in some instances, the size of
a customer's savings account.' The file also includes information of
public record such as court judgments, liens, indictments, and convic-
tions. 16 Personnel credit ratings contain most of the information out-
lined above as well as the applicant's employment record and reasons
for job changes.Y1 Insurance credit ratings are the type that draw the
most stinging criticism, for they usually contain information concern-
ing the applicant's marital life, private morals, drinking habits, extra-
marital affairs, and any tendencies toward deviate sexual behavior.' 8
12. 115 CoNG. REc. S1163 (Jan. 31, 1969).
13. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 1968, at 1, col. 6, and 12, Col. 1,
Eventually any of A.C.B.'s 110 million files will be available to local bureaus
at the touch of a button. A.C.B., working with International Business Ma-
chines Corp. and the Dallas and Houston credit bureaus, is designing a com-
puterized system that it expects to become nationwide in time. A central
switching system will connect computers at all local bureaus.
14. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 1968, at 1, col. 6. Since there are almost
as many reasons for applying for credit as there are people, the average consumer, in
his lifetime, will undoubtedly apply to several different places for credit. And, inas-
much as the credit rating agency owes his client and the consumer the duty of ac-
curately rating the consumer's credit, he will have to obtain information from
other credit rating agencies. The result is that information given by the consumer to
different persons for distinct reasons is assimilated into one "super-file."
15. Interview with Mr. John Collins, Assistant Manager, Retailers Credit Associa-
tion of Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
16. Hearings, at 91.
17. 57 GEO. L.J 509, 510 (1969).
18. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 1968, at 12, col. 1. In many instances these types
of files are kept separate. However, as stated by W. Lee Burge, President of Retail
Credit Co., on May 20, 1969,
• . . if you are asking the question would we put information that is perti-
nent to a credit report from an insurance file; yes sir . .. our endeavor is
to include pertinent information that would be pertinent to the particular
transaction.
Hearings, at 178.
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Areas of Alleged Abuses
There are four basic areas, the focus of critical challenge, that alleg-
edly constitute significant infringements to the rights of consumers. They
are inaccurate information, irrelevant information, difficulty in cor-
recting erroneous information, and invasion of privacy.1 9
Inaccurate information is probably one of the most frequently voiced
of the alleged abuses. It is argued that inaccuracies may arise in one of
several different ways. The first is confusion of file information among
different consumers.2" There are literally hundreds of people in the
United States with identical names or names that are so substantially
similar that confusion frequently results. Thus credit reporting inaccur-
acies arise when the adverse data of one consumer is inadvertently re-
ported as applying to another.
Biased information is also credited as a cause of inaccurate credit re-
ports.2 Authorities have pointed out that many credit files contain re-
marks such as "slow pay," or "litigious. ' 22  Proponents of industry reg-
ulation argue that credit rating agencies frequently engage in the dis-
criminatory practice of recording that a consumer may be "slow in pay-
ment" without investigating all of the surrounding circumstances. These
proponents charge that failure to make complete investigations may
often result in the use of biased information. 28  Thus, in doubtful situa-
tions and often without justification the consumer is labeled "slow
pay. "24
A third cause of inaccurate information is the collection of malicious
gossip and hearsay.25 Credit rating agencies frequently rely upon hear-
say26 especially when compiling information for an insurance credit rat-
19. 114 CONG. REC. S10029 (Aug. 2, 1968); 115 CONG. Rnc. S1163 (Jan. 31, 1969);
57 GEo. L.J. 509 (1969).
20. Id.
21. See 115 CONG. REC. S1163 (Jan. 31, 1969), where it says
A record of slow or nonpayment. . . does not necessarily mean he is a poor
risk. . . . While merchants have a wide variety of collection weapons, about
the only bargaining power consumers have is the threat to hold up payment.
Unfortunately, the consumer's side of the story does not find its way as
easily into the files of the credit bureau as does the merchant's version.
22. See Hearings, at 91.
23. 115 CONG. REC. S1163 (Jan. 31, 1969).
24. 115 CONG. Rc. S1164 (Jan. 31, 1969).
25. Id.
26. Hearings, at 184. Insurance investigators do not deny that they rely heavily
upon this source of information. Rather, they deny their reliance and, at least one
insurance official has charged that there is nothing improper in this practice. Hearsay
is a common practice in our way of life, he alleges. Our form of civilization is built
around hearsay. It is a way of life and a source of information that should not be
ignored. 115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1164 (Jan. 31, 1969); Hearings, at 194. Whether
or not one chooses to follow this line of reasoning, it is an undisputed fact that
much information for credit rating reports comes from interviewing neighbors and fel-
low employees of the consumer.
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Critics charge that computer errors also contribute to the collec-
tion of inaccurate information.28 They argue there are always many
"bugs" to be ironed out when a new computer system is implemented and
these defects frequently increase the amount of inaccurate information
contained in a consumer's credit rating file. The example that is typ-
ically cited is the California credit reporting agency that mistakenly
labeled a whole file drawer of good credit risks as bad credit risks.2 9 In
response, the industry points out that computers actually tend to reduce
errors and with sufficient time the overall number of mistakes will be
reduced.30 In evaluating the merits of this controversy it seems that the
industry does have the better argument. To remain competitive
credit rating agencies must modernize their operations and the fact that
computer implementation errors will occur is not sufficient reason for
stifling progress.
The final condition allegedly contributing to inaccurate information
is that credit rating files often contain incomplete information. Crit-
ics argue this problem often arises through the use of items of public
record. 1 As part of the normal information gathering process credit
rating investigators generally search the public records for any informa-
tion on the applicant. Many state statutes require the recording of
certain information, e.g., liens, indictments, convictions, bankruptcies,
arrests, suits, and the like, but very few states require the recording of the
disposition of these actions.3 2 The result is that an applicant may often
be subjected to eternally poor credit although the matter may have
been resolved in his favor. In line with this problem many of the credit
rating organizations have urged legislators to introduce legislation re-
quiring that dispositions of certain suits be recorded in the public rec-
ord.3 3
27. Insurance credit ratings are those credit ratings made on consumers who
have made application for the purchase of liability or life insurance. Insurance com-
panies consider monthly insurance payments to be a credit purchase of insurance, and,
therefore request credit ratings on the applicant before they will insure him.
28. 115 CONG. Rnc. S1163, 1164 (Jan. 31, 1969).
29. Id.
30. Hearings, at 229.
31. See 115 CONG. Rnc. S1163, 1164 (Jan. 31, 1969).
32. Although every state evidently requires the recording of this information, no
state appears to require the recording of the dispositions of such actions. Governor
Reagan's Task Force on January 19, 1970, pointed out this problem and called for
state legislative action. Report on Credit and Personnel Reporting Practices in Cal-
ifornia, Jan. 19, 1970, at 9.
33. Id. The recommendation of Governor Reagan's Task Force to have California
implement requirements for the recording of dispositions as well as initiation of legal
actions is particularly forceful when one examines the lopsided composition of the
Task Force. The Task Force had eighteeen chairs. One was filled by a representa-
tive of the general business community, six were credit grantors, four were representa-
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The second major area of alleged abuse by the credit rating industry
to the rights of consumers is said to be the inclusion of irrelevant infor-
mation in the consumer's credit file.34 It is argued that this situation
often arises in at least two different ways. The first point of contention
has already been briefly touched upon; outdated information which is
often derived from matters that become public record is claimed to be
irrelevant.8 5 A second way in which irrelevant information may be in-
cluded in the consumer's credit file is through the use of too many ex-
trinsic facts.36 The proponents for regulation of the credit rating industry
argue that only the facts pertinent for credit grantors are those that
are relevant to their business purposes. Under the present system, how-
ever, an employer requesting a personnel rating may not only confirm
the applicant's prior residences and former places of employment
but may also learn most, if not all of the personal details obtained from
an insurance investigation.37  Consequently, the proponents for regu-
tives of various credit rating agencies, and seven may be described as representatives of
consumer interests.
34. 115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1165 (Jan. 31, 1969).
35. See text following note 29 supra.
36. 115 CONG. Ruc. S1165 (Jan. 31, 1969). Perhaps an example would best
illustrate this problem. Suppose a young man, age 21, has just married and he and
his bride want to buy a few furnishings for their new home. In all likelihood this
couple will have, at best, only a limited cash reserve. Therefore, to purchase their
desired furnishings, they will need to establish a credit rating. The credit grantor
will contact a local credit rating agency and the agency, using the information ob-
tained from the young man, will make the credit investigation. Since this would be a
rating for retail credit, the information obtained would most likely be composed of
former residences, length of stay, employment history, reasons for leaving, cash on
hand, and credit history, if any. Again let us suppose the investigation proves to be
favorable and the young man is granted credit.
Continuing our hypothetical situation, six months later an insurance salesman calls
on the young couple and convinces them of the merits of life insurance. The young
couple signs the insurance application and the salesman turns the information obtained
from it over to his credit rating agency. Since this would be a credit rating for in-
surance, there would be added to the young man's general credit rating file such in-
formation as marital troubles, drinking habits, and any tendencies toward deviant sexual
behavior. Again continuing the example, the young bride is now pregnant and our
hypothetical young man decides it is time he did something about improving his em-
ployment opportunities. He would visit an employer and fill out an employment
application. This employer, who is desirous of obtaining the best employee possible,
would then forward the information obtained from the employment application to his
favorite credit rating agency. The details that the employer would, in all likelihood,
receive back from the credit rating agency would include the irrelevant details ob-
tained from the insurance investigation as well as details from investigations made for
retail credit. It is this type of irrelevancy that the proponents for regulation object to.
See also 57 GEo. L.J. 509, 510 (1969); Hearings, at 74, 194; and the statement of
Ira A. Brown, Jr., General Counsel and Secretary of Credit Data Corporation, to the
Governor's Task Force to Investigate Credit, Personnel and Insurance Reporting, at8, 9; I do not think (a very) compelling argument can be made that when an
individual applies for credit he tacitly consents to the supplying of his
record with respect to that transaction to a prospective employer, various
insurance companies, or anyone, other than a credit grantor.
Credit Data Corporation has, therefore, taken the position that credit in-
formation contained in its files will be available only to bona fide credit
grantors. The basic principle is that information gathered for one purpose
should not be made available for other purposes. [Emphasis added].
37. This result does not always follow. For example, Credit Data Corporation
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lation charge that this type of procedure violates the consumer's right of
privacy. They urge the enactment of legislation that would force credit
rating agencies to maintain separate files on consumers. These sep-
arate files would contain only the types of details pertinent to each of
the three types of credit ratings .3
The third major area of infringement upon the rights of consumers
is said to result from the difficulty the consumer has in correcting the
inaccurate or irrelevant information contained in his credit file.3 9 The
main thrust of the problem is that many consumers do not know when
and if their credit rating files contain inaccurate or erroneous informa-
tion. Most credit rating agencies assert that if a consumer informs
their office of a possible error in the consumer's file they will investigate
the allegation and if necessary correct the mistake.40 Proponents for
regulation counter that the answer given by the industry is inadequate
and nonresponsive. How is a consumer to take advantage of the op-
portunities supposedly available to him if he does not know (1) what a
credit rating agency is, or (2) that his file may contain inaccurate
data? These proponents charge that the industry's failure to adequately
inform the public of the existence and operation of the credit rating in-
dustry has amounted to an overt attempt to keep the industry and its
mistakes a secret from consumers.4" In support of their allegation,
proponents cite many examples, the most damaging of which is the
credit rating agency-credit grantor contract.42  As now written these
contracts typically bind the credit grantor to a conspiracy of silence.
The credit grantor is prohibited from disclosing to the applicant either
the reason for refusal of credit or the identity of the agency which made
the credit rating. Consequently, the applicant is effectively blocked in
any attempt he might wish to make to correct inaccuracies in his credit
rating file. In defense, the industry alleges that the use of the secretive
covenants in these contracts is on the decline., The larger agencies such
as Retail Credit Company have discontinued the use of such covenants.43
Agencies that continue to use the secret covenants device argue that the
sources of information that must be relied on are not always the most
makes a commendable effort to keep information obtained from insurance investiga-
tions separate from credit and personnel rating files. However, for contra practices,
see note 18 supra.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. 115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1164 (Jan. 31, 1969).
40. Hearings, at 233; Credit Bureau Policies to Protect Consumer Privacy, As-
sociated Credit Bureaus of America. Interview with Mr. Charles J. Benson, Vice-
President, Credit Bureau Metro, Inc., of San Francisco, California, Aug. 12, 1970.
41. 115 CoNG. REc. S1163, 1164 (Jan. 31, 1969).
42. Id.
43. Hearings, at 189, 190.
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reliable and the defenses to defamation are not always defined with suf-
ficient clarity to assure protection of the industry in light of the large
number of lawsuits that might be initiated . 4
The preparation of most credit rating reports take an average of
thirty minutes, and the fee charged the credit grantor is nominal."
Most credit rating agencies say that they want to have correct infor-
mation in their records and they feel sympathetic to consumers, but
that they also want the consumers to be sympathetic to their problems.
The industry asks that when a consumer requests that his credit rating
file be checked for accuracy, the consumer should realize that the
agency is performing this service at a cost.46  More so than most other
businesses, managers of credit rating agencies must be cognizant of
the production of their employees. When a consumer takes the time
of an employee in confirming the accuracy of the information con-
tained in a credit report, the production of the employee is lost to the
agency. It is for this reason, the industry alleges, that some agencies
schedule appointments with consumers for the purpose of checking
the consumer's file, or charge them a nominal fee for the employee's
time.4" The proponents of regulation charge that these answers given
by the industry are merely fictions created to perpetuate the indus-
try's policy of secrecy. Many of these proponents argue that the
consumer has a right to have only correct information in his credit rat-
ing report; that good credit is not a mere privilege.4' Also it is argued
that these answers are not justification for the present policies. Rather,
they are "roadblocks" to any attempt by consumers to correct inaccura-
cies. 49
The fourth, and undoubtedly most serious of the alleged abuses to the
rights of consumers, is the invasion of the consumer's right of privacy.0
The right of privacy has been defined as the right to be let alone; the
right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity.' 1 It is charged
44. See remarks of Ira A. Brown, Jr., General Counsel and Secretary of CreditData Corporation, to the Governor's Task Force to Investigate Credit, Personnel and
Insurance Reporting, where he noted this argument.45. Privacy; The Horror Side of Credit, TnvE, Dec. 20, 1968, at 79; 115 CONG.REc. S1163 (Jan. 31, 1969); Hearings, at 176. The minimum charges levied by Re-tailers Credit Association of Sacramento, California for their standard credit reports
are: Verbal-$1.10; Written-1.75. "Schedule of Reporting Services and Charges,"
R.C.A. of Sacramento, California.
46. Interview with Mr. Charles Benson, Vice-President, Credit Bureau Metro,Inc., San Francisco, California, Aug. 12, 1970.
47. Sallee, The Credit Bureau's Obligation to the Consumer, MANAGEmENT, Janu-
ary, 1968, at 4.
48. 115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1167 (Jan. 31, 1969).
49. Id.
50. Hearings, at 74, 82. See also 57 GEO. L.J. 509 (1969).
51. 1 HARPER & JAMES, THm LAW OF TORTS § 9.6, at 681 (1956).
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that invasion of the consumer's right of privacy occurs in several different
ways. The first aspect of the alleged invasion results from the absence of
any substantial guidelines concerning to whom the credit material will be
distributed.5 2 Though it is argued the consumer impliedly gave per-
mission for the collection of information about him when he applied
for credit, 53 this implied permission is not an unlimited license. Rather,
it is only a limited implied consent and the credit rating agencies abuse
this limited privilege by not formulating guidelines concerning the dis-
tribution of the information in their possession. 4 It is the argument of
proponents for regulation that this failure to act by the credit rating in-
dustry violates the consumer's right to be free from unwarranted pub-
licity.55 The large and vocal credit rating agencies have responded to
this charge with an unqualified denial. Spokesmen for Credit Data
Corporation and the Associated Credit Bureaus of America contend they
do have specific guidelines to whom consumer credit information may
be distributed. 56  Credit Data Corporation lists its guidelines on this
point as follows: 57
(1) Credit information is available only to bona fide credit grant-
ors; (2) Credit information is available to credit grantors only
for credit purposes; (3) Credit information should consist only of
factual information pertaining to credit performance; (4) Credit
information must be accurate and fair; (5) Credit information
must be timely and purged of out-of-date facts.
Credit Data Corporation is undoubtedly correct when it says that its
self-imposed guidelines are much more restrictive than any legislation
that has been given serious consideration in Washington, D.C., or Cali-
52. 115 CONG. Rxc. S1163, 1165 (Jan. 31, 1969).
53. Some persons have suggested that it is permissible to imply that the consumer
has given his consent to be investigated when he made application for credit, but that
the implied consent cannot be carried beyond the original purpose for giving the
consent. This is to say that an implied consent to be investigated for insurance
credit is not a continuing implied consent to distribute the information obtained to
other types of credit grantors who do not have a legitimate business interest in the
information. 115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1165 (Jan. 31, 1969); Hearings at 231.
54. 115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1164 (Jan. 31, 1969); note 18 supra.
55. U.S. Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin recited a vivid example of this
charge while introducing S. 823:
[A] Columbia law professor . wrote a credit bureau to see whether the
agency would supply information about a research assistant on the grounds
that she was being considered for a promotion. The credit bureau quickly re-
sponded, supplying information on her marital and financial status, previous
employment record, police record, character, habits, and morals. All this was
freely given despite the fact that Columbia was not a credit grantor and was
not a member of the local bureau.
115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1165 (January 31, 1969).
56. For the position of Retail Credit Co., see note 18 supra. Associated Credit
Bureaus enumerates its guidelines in Credit Bureau Policies to Protect Consumer
Privacy (1969).
57. Hearings, at 224.
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fornia.5s By creating these voluntary guidelines the credit rating in-
dustry hopes the federal and state legislators will accept the position that
the industry is willing and able to regulate itself; that statutory regulation
is unnecessary. Unfortunately, however, these well intentioned credit
rating organizations cannot speak for the entire industry and the guide-
lines that Credit Data Corporation and Associated Credit Bureaus of
America have set forth are simply a self-imposed code of morality estab-
lishing no legal duties. 50
An absence of adequate internal security measures is another way in
which credit rating organizations allegedly violate the privacy of con-
sumers.6" Because of the low fees charged for credit reports, the indus-
try is only able to hire people willing to work for low salaries. In so
doing, the industry does not obtain that quality of employee who is sym-
pathetic to the industry's efforts to protect the consumer's privacy.01
Proponents for regulation argue that the credit rating industry has only
a limited license to collect and retain information pertaining to a con-
sumer's credit standing. This limited license imposes a duty upon the
credit rating industry to provide adequate security measures to prevent
perverted snooping by unauthorized employees. 62  The credit rating in-
dustry admits this is a problem but denies that it has taken no action.
Industry officials counter that when new employees are hired part of their
orientation includes a presentation regarding the obligation they owe to
protect the privacy of consumers. If employees are caught in the act of
perverted snooping for personal pleasure, they will be immediately
fired.6" Though spokesmen for the industry concede there would be an
advantage to employing special security guards, they are quick to assert
the cost-profit limitation.6 4
58. See note 1 supra.
59. [Alithough we are convinced that all the agencies we studied strive
earnestly to achieve the highest possible level of accuracy, there will always be
a substantial possibility, while the profession remains unregulated, of irrespon-
sible persons setting up reporting agencies and conducting them in a careless
manner.
PRIVACY AND COMMERCIAL REPORTING AGENCIES, LEGAL RESEARCH INSTITuTE OF THE
UNIVERsrrY OF MANITOBA 16 (October, 1968).
60. 115 CONG. REc. S1163, 1166 (Jan. 31, 1969).
61. Id. The recommendation of the California State Personnel Board is that
there be at least one chief supervisor, with other subordinate supervisors, for every
group of ten to twenty-five employees. Such a requirement is necessary to maintain
proper employee efficiency and office internal security. A PROGRAM MANUAL FOR
IMPROVING CLERICAL UTLnZATION (California State Personnel Board, April 1968);
Specifications for Supervising Clerk 1. Many credit rating agencies already meet
these recommendations. Retailers Credit Association of Sacramento, California, for
example, has one general supervisor and two subordinates for thirty employees.
Interview with Mr. John Collins, Assistant Manager, Retailers Credit Association of
Sacramento, California, August 17, 1970.
62. See note 60 supra.
63. Interview with Mr. John Collins, Assistant Manager, Retailers Credit Associa-
tion of Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
64. Id.; 115 CONG. REC. S1163, 1166 (Jan. 31, 1969).
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The third way the industry allegedly violates the privacy of con-
sumers is by having a loose policy or procedure for investigating the
prospective users of the credit information.65  The proponents for regu-
lation charge the industry is interested more in their profit margin than
in the privacy of consumers; that credit rating agencies conduct little if
any investigation to determine if the person requesting the information
is a credit grantor, or indeed, if he has any legitimate business interest
in the information. 6 It is charged that anyone, by paying the required
fees, can become a subscriber of a credit rating agency and obtain per-
sonal information on consumers simply by asking. As noted earlier,
proponents for regulation assert that the credit rating agency owes a duty
to the consumer not to disclose the information to anyone who does not
possess a legitimate business interest6 7 and this duty extends to an obli-
gation, voluntarily assumed by the credit rating agencies, to make a
proper and adequate investigation into the legitimate business interest of
any party requesting the information.68
Although there is some dissent,69 most industry officials agree that
credit rating agencies owe some duty to be familiar with the agencies
who request information. The main area of disagreement appears to be
the extent of the duty." Critics of the industry demand that agen-
cies make thorough investigations. 7' The position of the industry offi-
cials is that the term "thorough" is difficult to define. Thus they are left
with no choice of alternatives other than those they consider reasonable
and practical in light of their own problems. The remedies considered
reasonable and practical by industry officials are the procedures pres-
ently used by most credit rating agencies. Basically, these proce-
dures involve an initial investigation into the character of the business
requesting the services of a credit rating agency. If the business is a
credit grantor, it will usually be accepted as a subscriber. After ac-
ceptance, if the subscriber is ever found by the agency to be using the
credit files for reasons other than bona fide credit purposes, the sub-
scriber will either be reprimanded or refused further service.72  The
65. 115 CONG. REc. S1 163, 1165 (Jan. 31, 1969).
66. Id.
67. Id. See text at note 53 supra.
68. Hearings at 98.
69. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
70. There appears to be no authority that characterizes the objective procedural
process used by credit rating agencies for qualifying an applicant as a credit grantor.
However, it has been suggested that the process is, at best, a cursory one. Hearings,
at 98.
71. Proxmire, Unregulated Credit Reporting Could Ruin Your Life, FAMI.Y
WEEKLY, February 16, 1969, at 6.
72. The Application For Membership and Service Contract of Retailers Credit
Association of Sacramento, California, specifies that the credit grantor may be canceled
as a member of the agency's files are used for reasons other than bona fide credit
purposes.
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industry argues these procedures are as stringent as practically pos-
sible; that it is economically impossible for agencies to make detailed
follow-through investigations into the intended use of information each
time a request for a credit rating is made.7 3
In summary it would appear the consumer certainly has a valid right
to insist that credit rating agencies act with reasonable care when they
are distributing personal information. On the other hand, it is unreal-
istic to suggest the imposition of an obligation upon the industry which
would be economically impractical since this would probably be de-
structive of what is now an important and necessary commercial ser-
vice. Some large firms have made significant efforts to impose strict
self-control on the industry and to the extent that self-policing now
is practiced by these agencies, the consumer is adequately protected.
The main problem, however, is that self-regulation is voluntary,
without universal application in the industry, and cannot be imposed
upon unwilling firms.
There is a major disagreement within the industry concerning the
propriety of opening credit files to non-credit granting governmental
agencies. 71 The problem is created by such governmental agencies as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service.
At present both make extensive use of the information possessed by
credit rating agencies. The questions raised, therefore, concern the logic
of admitting, in the first instance, that the consumer has extended only
a limited privilege over the use of his personal information, and then, on
the other hand, allowing non-credit granting governmental agencies
the right to use the information. 7' The alleged justification for per-
mitting government use of credit rating information is two-fold. First,
the information is necessary for the maintenance of national security.
Second, perhaps the particular agency does not subscribe to the theory
that the consumer has merely extended a limited privilege over the distri-
bution of his personal information, but rather that a credit application
is an implied form of consent to an investigation. Once the informa-
tion is collected, these agencies feel it becomes their property.70 As
73. Interview with Mr. John Collins, Assistant Manager, Retailers Credit Associa-
tion of Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
74. For example, Retail Credit Co. of Atlanta, Georgia, feels it is perfectly proper
to allow governmental agencies the unrestricted use of its files. Retail Credit feels
it is in the public interest to voluntarily cooperate with these agencies. Hearings, at
221. However, Credit Data Corporation feels it is an undesirable practice to disclose
credit information to other than bona fide credit grantors "except in response to valid
legal process." Code of Ethics and Operating Rules of Credit Data Corporation.
75. Remarks of Ira A. Brown, Jr., General Counsel and Secretary of Credit Data
Corporation to the Governor's Task Force to Investigate Credit, Personnel and In-
surance Reporting (Aug. 26, 1969).
76. This position is evidently harmonious with the precepts of copyright law. It
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property the information may then be distributed freely and without lim-
itation. The opposite view has been taken by, among others, Credit Data
Corporation of California. It is the policy of this corporation to liberally
construe the consumer's right of privacy. In this vein, Credit Data has
determined not to release any credit information to a governmental
agency unless it is compelled to do so under court order r7
It would appear that both arguments possess some merit. It is true
that the action of invasion of privacy involves the right of a consumer to
be free from unwarranted publicity; however, the right is not absolute.
According to some authorities the right exists only to the extent it is
consistent with law or public policy.78 Since, in the absence of con-
trolling statutes, the courts will determine public policy, it is impor-
tant to note the tendency of judicial decisions to expand the remedy
for invasion of privacy and to give preference to individual rights in those
cases where they conflict with business interests .7  The right of govern-
ment agencies to obtain access to credit investigation files may very
likely be constrained in the future with or without legislation.
JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Prior to the 1970 Session of the California Legislature, California
consumers had only common law remedies available to redress wrongs
inflicted upon their credit reputations. The 1970 California Legisla-
ture attempted to add significant statutory relief, though not intended
has been said,
[TIhere is a common law property [right] in facts and information col-
lected and utilized by skill, labor and expense, although the same information
is available to anyone who chooses to collect it. Such property had been
recognized and protected in. . . credit ratings ....
18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 10(d) at 142 (1939); Ladd v. Oxnard,
75 F. 703 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896); Jewelers Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers Weekly Pub.
Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898).
77. See note 75 supra. Also, in his remarks before Governor Reagan's Task
Force on Credit, Personnel and Insurance Reporting, Ira C. Brown, General Counsel
for Credit Data stated that he believed the "limited, implied consent" theory applied to
credit rating agencies and that it probably would be an invasion of the consumer's right
of privacy for an agency to release credit information to persons other than bona fide
credit grantors.
78. 1 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 9.6, at 683 (1956); 77 C.J.S. Right
of Privacy § 2, at 399 (1952).
79. Melvin v. Reed, 112 Cal. App. 285 (1931) (Motion picture showing inci-
dents from murder trial held not actionable); Lillie v. Warner Bros., 139 Cal. App.
724 (1934) (Act in breach of contract is not an invasion of privacy); Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304 (1939) (Publication of a picture of a person
who has unwillingly become of general public interest is not an invasion of privacy);
Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207 (1942) (Circulating a handwritten
letter that falsely bore an immoral innuendo was an invasion of privacy); Stryker v.
Republic Pictures, 108 Cal. App. 2d 191 (1951) (Publicity of activities of serviceman
during war is not an invasion of privacy); Kelly v. Johnson Pub. Co., 160 Cal. App.
2d 718 (1958) (An injury to reputation is not an invasion of privacy); James v.
Screen Gems, 174 Cal. App. 2d 650 (1959) (Publicity of activities of decedent is not
an invasion of privacy of decedent's spouse); Carlisle v. Fawcett Pub. Co., 201 Cal. App.
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to detract from the importance of the existing remedies. The new
statutory remedies will be examined in detail in the following section.
Because the judicial remedies are still of major importance to con-
sumers in California and elsewhere, however, their use and function-
ability as separate remedies should be reviewed.
The principal judicial remedies available to consumers are civil
actions in negligence, defamation of character, and invasion of pri-
vacy.8 0 In addition, there have been cases seeking injunctive relief as a
primary remedy; however, the consistent result has been a denial of
equity jurisdiction based upon the existence of an adequate remedy at
law. 81
There have been a number of actions brought against credit rating
and mercantile agencies on the theory of negligence.8 2  From holdings
of these cases it is apparent the principal issue of contention is the ex-
tent of the duty to be imposed upon the agency. Generally, courts have
held that a credit rating agency owes a duty to the consumer to act as
a reasonable man under the circumstances. If the credit rating agency
does not utilize its professional skills in a reasonable manner, i.e., if
the agency assimilates infornafion without taking reasonable steps to
insure authenticity, or if the agency disseminates the information with-
out making a reasonable investigation to determine if the recipient has
a legitimate business interest, the agency may have breached its duty
of due care to the consumer. If duty and the other prima facie elements
of the action can be satisfied, the agency will then be liable both for its
own negligence and for the negligence of its agents and servants. 83  As a
practical remedy to a consumer, however, it appears that this remedy
may be inadequate because credit rating agencies are agents of the
credit grantor;84 they owe only a duty of due care in the preparation and
2d 733 (1962) (Privacy requires a weighing of public and private interests); York
v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (Police officer who photographed assault
victim in indecent positions and then circulated the pictures violated her right of pri-
vacy); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (Publication of
picture of person before he came to public attention was an invasion of privacy);
Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20 (1969) (Even public official may sue where news-
paper story was so lacking in justification as to amount to an invasion of privacy).
80. 57 GEo. L.J. 509 (1969); 53 C.J.S. Libel & Slander § 52, at 100 (1948).
81. To obtain injunctive relief for invasion of privacy the court must find that
the remedy at law is inadequate. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 132, at 678 (1945). This
prerequisite has created great problems in the availability of this remedy, for the
general rule is that actions at law for defamation provide adequate legal remedies.
See Raymond v. Russell, 143 Mass. 295, 9 N.E. 544 (1887), which held the legal rem-
edies of libel and slander were adequate and, therefore, there was no basis for the ex-
tension of equitable jurisdiction. For injunctive relief the court said there must be
breach of trust or breach of contract.
82. See Dun v. City Nat. Bank of Birmingham, 58 F. 174 (2d Cir. 1893);
Xiques v. Bradstreet Co., 70 Hun. 334, 24 N.Y.S. 48 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Crew v. Brad-
street, 134 Pa. 191, 19 A. 500 (1890).
83. Dun v. City Nat. Bank of Birmingham, 58 F. 174 (2d Cir. 1893).
84. See generally 15 AM. JUR. 2d Collection and Credit Agencies § 3, at 551 (1964).
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dissemination of credit reports. 85 Thus, unless the credit agency has a
contract which guarantees the accuracy of its reports, the consumer must
prove a failure to make due and diligent inquiries or he is barred from
recovery.
Defamation, principally libel,86 has been the vanguard of remedies
chosen by consumers over the years to redress injuries inflicted upon
their credit reputations.87 Its practicability is questionable, however,
since under the general rule, credit rating organizations are given a
qualified privilege 8 for dissemination of credit information. 89 If the
consumer wishes to proceed on the theory of defamation, he must prove
that the credit agency communication was made with malice,90 or under
such circumstances that reasonable men would not have acted in the
same manner;91 or that the information was communicated to a party
who did not have a legitimate business interest in the information."
Though some states have unconditionally refused to extend the de-
85. Globe v. Perth, 116 N.J. Law 168, 182 A. 641 (1936).
86. Referring to the difficulty of defining libel, Prosser has said:
The distinction itself between libel and slander is not free from difficulty and
uncertainty. As it took form in the seventeenth century, it was one between
written and oral words. But later on libel was extended to include pictures,
signs, statutes, motion pictures, and even conduct carrying a defamatory im-
putation. . . . From this it has been concluded that libel is that which is
communicated by the sense of sight, or perhaps also by touch or smell, while
slander is that which is conveyed by the sense of hearing.
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF rHE LA W OF TORTS § 107, at 770 (3rd ed. 1964). [Hereinafter
cited as PRossER].
87. 57 GEO. L.J. 509, 513 (1969).
88. A qualified privilege is a privilege that may be lost if certain specific or im-
plied limitations upon the privilege are not observed. N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S. Co. v.
Garcia, 16 F.2d 734 (1st Cir. 1926); Johnson v. Finance Acceptance Co. of Ga., 118
Fla. 397, 159 So. 364 (1935); Bender v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N.E.2d
595 (1943); Rodger v. Am. Kennel Club, 138 Misc. 310, 245 N.Y.S. 662 (Sup. Ct.
1930); Solow v. G.M. Truck Co., 64 F.2d 105 (1933); Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan.
47, 127 P. 533 (1912).
89. 53 C.1.S. Libel & Slander § 240, at 364 (1948); Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v.
Jensen Salsbery, 17 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1926); Mel v. Edge, 68 Ga. App. 314, 22
S.E.2d 738 (1942); Tower v. Crosby, 125 Misc. 403, 211 N.Y.S. 571 (Sup. Ct. 1925),
rev'd on other grounds, 212 N.Y.S. 219, 214 N.Y. App. 392 (1925); M. Rosenberg
& Sons v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 29 S.E.2d 375 (1944). The rationale for the qualified
privilege, obviously enough, is that the communication of credit information is a socially
desirable goal, and that the protection of qualified privilege is necessary in order to
effectuate this public policy.
90. Iden v. Evans Model Laundry, 121 Neb. 184, 236 N.W. 444 (1931); Stevens
v. Morse, 185 Wis. 500, 201 N.W. 815 (1925).
91. See generally Hallen, Excessive Publication in Defamation, 16 MINN. L. REv.
160 (1932); Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in
Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REv. 865 (1931).
92. See Johns v. Associated Aviation Underwriters, 203 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1953)
(insurers to insured); Cook v. Gust, 155 Wis. 594, 145 N.W. 225 (1914) (promoter to
prospective investor); Hales v. Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, 114 Utah 186,
197 P.2d 910 (1948) (bank to payee of forged check). Also of interest is New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this case one of the three police
commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, sued the New York Times for publishing a
partially false and derogatory advertisement that concerned the police of Montgomery,
Alabama. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the Times did not have knowledge
of the falsity when it published the advertisement, and said, at 279,
The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public
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fense of qualified privilege to credit rating organizations, °3 in most states
the privilege does exist. Hence, as a remedy for consumers, defama-
tion is only marginally effective.
The tort action for invasion of privacy is probably the most important
judicial remedy available to a consumer because of its far reaching pos-
official [emphasis added] from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The rationale for the holding was that if a publisher were made to guarantee the
accuracy of his statements such a rule would force "self-censorship" and amount to aprior restraint on first amendment liberties. Thus a public official suing a private
citizen must prove that the defamatory matter was communicated with actual malice or
he is prohibited from recovering damages.
In Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Sullivan
rule to actions involving invasions of privacy among private citizens. The court
held that the plaintiff must prove ". . . the defendant published the report with knowl-
edge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." (385 U.S. at 388). Inas-
much, therefore, as the Sullivan and Hill doctrines concerned the communication of
information in the public domain, it does not appear likely that they will be made
applicable to credit rating organizations. The information communicated by such
organizations is generally of interest only to a limited part of the public. If suchinformation were held to be in the public domain and thus subject to the Sullivan and
Hill holdings, however, the effect would be detrimental to consumers. This conclu-
sion follows, for the inclusion of derogatory information in a credit rating file is said
to be permissible for public policy reasons (see collected cases at note 89, supra).
And credit rating agencies generally make good faith efforts to authenticate derogatoryinformation (Hearings, at 185). Thus, if the Sullivan and Hill doctrines were ex-
tended to include defamatory actions among private citizens it would appear that only
the most blatant abuses of the privilege to communicate derogatory information for
credit purposes would give the consumer a right of recovery.93. E.g., in Pacific Packing Company v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 P. 1007,
1010 (1914), the Idaho Supreme Court said,
The only safe and just rule either in law or morals is the one that exacts truth-
fulness in business as well as elsewhere and places a penalty upon falsehoods,
making it dangerous for a mercantile, commercial, or any other agency to sell
and traffic falsehood and misrepresentation about the standing and credit of
men or corporations. The company that goes into the business of selling
• reports about others should assume the responsibility for its acts, and
must be sure that it is peddling the truth.
In California the decision is clouded. The provisions of the California statute read:A privileged publication. . . is one made. . . [in a communication, without
malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or(2) by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a
reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or(3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 47.
The California Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the question in 1965,
but it avoided the issue for a seemingly artificial reason. The case was Stationers Corp.
v. Dun & Bredstreet, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 412 (1965). Defendant, a mercantile agency,
communicated a credit report concerning plaintiff's business to a third party. Plaintiff
considered this report libelous and brought suit. Defendant invoked Civil Code § 47(3)
as a defense. The court stated, at 420-421:
It would be grossly unjust to permit a defendant, in the pursuit of his com-
mercial interests, to rely upon the special privilege granted by section 47, sub-division 3, without requiring him to disclose information in his possession
necessary to determine whether the statements were made without malice.
The ratio decidendi of this case was quite limited. The case did not decide whether thequalified privilege contained in Civil Code section 47(3) applied, or did not apply, to
mercantile agencies. Rather, the case held that mercantile agencies could not use
the privilege if they refused to disclose the source of their information to a plaintiff
who was trying to prove knowledge of falsity and malice. The holding of this case,
therefore, appears to be artificial because the statute itself speaks of no limitations such
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sibilities. Invasion of privacy is actionable in all but four states.94
As with the development of many other tort actions, the creation of the
right of privacy was probably generated most by analogizing it to the
law of property rights. Judge Cooley, in 1888, coined the phrase, "the
right to be let alone."95 This phrase could quite correctly be analogized
to the property remedy of trespass. In property law, and later in the
law of torts, one in lawful possession of property may obtain at least
nominal damages and an injunction as a remedy against a party who
had invaded his property interest without consent.96  This is the prop-
erty owner's remedy for invasions of his "right to be let alone." The
concept advanced by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 was that human
well-being is far more important than the well-being of property, and
the remedies available for injuries to the person should be at least as
extensive as those for injuries to property. The courts gradually ac-
knowledged the merit of allowing an injured party to sue for the inva-
sion of his own personal interests rather than fictionalizing to some in-
vasion of property.97  Since 1890, appellate level cases have dealt with
an innumerable number of phases of the plaintiff's "right to be let
alone." Referring to these phases, Dean Prosser says:
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of
four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by
the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common
except that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff 'to be let alone.' 98
It is often argued that conduct of credit rating agencies constitutes an in-
vasion of one or another of the consumer's rights to be free from intru-
as disclosure of sources. Rather, the true meaning of the case is probably a hint to
the legislature that the California Supreme Court considers this an inequity in the
statute law in need of modification.
The states that have given credit rating agencies a qualified privilege generally do not
have statutes that are as broad and sweeping as the California statutory privilege. It
would appear, therefore, that one of two conclusions can be drawn: (1) The California
Supreme Court does not wish to give any privilege to credit rating organizations and
will continue to create artificial barriers to the implementation of the statute; or (2) the
California Supreme Court wants to give credit rating agencies a qualified privilege but
is prevented from doing so by what it considers to be overbreadth in Civil Code sec-
tion 47(3).
94. Brunson v. Ranks Army Stores, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955);
Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909); Milner v. Red River Valley Pub.
Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (Texas 1952); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d
925 (1956).
95. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
96. Brame v. Clark, 148 N.C. 364, 62 S.E. 418 (1908).
97. Although New York trial court cases accepted the concept of privacy as
early as 1890, the Georgia Supreme Court was the first review court to embrace the
views of Warren & Brandeis; the case was Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). With the introduction of the Restatement of Torts
in the 1930's, which recognized a cause of action for "unreasonable and serious"
interference with privacy, many other states leaped aboard the bandwagon. PROSSER,
§ 112, at 831.
98. PROSSER § 112, at 832.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 2
sion of his privacy.99 In the area of intrusion, the right to privacy is an
interest protected from illegal wiretapping,100 "peeping toms,"'' 1 nui-
sance telephone calls,102 and unauthorized prying into bank accounts,10 3
among others. Somewhat akin to the remedy of trespass, the cases
dealing with the right of privacy show unmistakenly that there must be
something in the nature of unauthorized prying or intrusion into the
plaintiff's right to be let alone' 04 in an area that was reasonably ex-
pected to be private, and would be offensive or objectionable to a reason-
able man of ordinary sensibilities. 05 If the intrusion involves a matter of
public knowlege, or a matter subject to public access, there is generally
no interest protected by the right of privacy. 10 6
Proponents for regulation of the credit rating industry usually point
to insurance investigations by the industry as the type of conduct most
likely to intrude upon the consumer's right of privacy.107  A credit in-
vestigation for insurance usually results in the collection and recording
of items relating to the consumer's marital problems, private morals,
drinking habits and extramarital affairs.' 0 8  Such matters are private,
without relevance to granting credit and violate the consumer's right
of privacy.
Unlike defamation, where credit rating agencies have, in most juris-
dictions, the defense of qualified privilege, consent is the only defense
to an action for invasion of privacy.10 9 If the consumer can carry
the burden of proving that an intrusion was made into a private aspect
of his life objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibility,
he may recover unless he has consented to the intrusion. For the
defendant to be entitled to the defense of consent, however, statutes
in all states that recognize the right of privacy require that consent
99. Prosser lists the four types of possible invasions as intrusion, public dis-
closure of private facts, false light in the public eye, and appropriation. PROSSER
§ 112, at 833, 834, 837, and 839.
100. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); La Crone v. Ohio
Bell Tel. Co., 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 N.E.2d 15 (1961).
101. Moore v. N.Y. Elevated R. Co., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892); Pritchett
v. Board of Com'rs of Knox County, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908).
102. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956); Harms v. Miami
Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1961).
103. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929); Zimmerman v. Wilson,
81 F.2d 847 (3d cir. 1936).
104. PRossER § 112, at 833.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 57 GEo. L.J. 509, 525 (1969).
108. See text at note 18, supra.
109. There are privileges, e.g., privilege of giving further publicity to already
public figures, Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), that apply
generally to the concept of privacy. However, consent is the only defense to inva-
sions of privacy occasioned by intrusions. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d
Cir. 1947).
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be given in writing.110 And, "[tihe defendant's honest belief that
he has the plaintiffs consent, when he has not, will go to mitigate
punitive damages, but otherwise is not a defense.""' It may seem at
first glance that since the consumer must waive his right to privacy by
written consent the credit rating industry would rarely have a defense
to an action for invasion of privacy because consumers very rarely sign
express consent forms to future investigations." 12 Yet the dearth of
suits and judgments for consumers suggests that the industry has other
means of avoiding liability for these intrusions.
One of the principal methods used by the agencies as a protec-
tion against the initiation of suits for invasion of privacy by con-
sumers is simply maintaining their information files with the utmost
secrecy to prevent any notice to the consumer." 3  Even though a con-
sumer may be denied credit, insurance, or employment as a result of a
credit investigation, without access to the investigation file he has no
opportunity to procede with a legal action against the credit agency.
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
For sixty years Oklahoma was the only sovereign body in the United
States with legislation regulating credit rating agencies." 4 In 1970 this
situation has changed. California, after two years of legislative study,115
has adopted the Consumer Credit Reporting Act.116 During the two
110. PROSSER, § 112, at 851.
111. Id.
112. For example, an applicant for insurance signs an application form, but these
forms generally do not contain any express statement that the applicant has consented
to an investigation of his credit standing. And even if a consumer should sign such
a consent statement, he might be able to have it stricken from the contract on the
basis that the actual invasion went beyond the fair construction of the intended con-
sent.
113. W. Lee Burge, president, Retail Credit Co., denies that this is presently the
policy of his organization. His testimony on this point is quite interesting:
Senator Proxmire. On page C-75 of Manager's Manual it says: 'Neither deny
nor admit making a report. Decline to give a categorical yes or no to any
demand by caller that you tell him whether you have reported on him.'
Mr. Burge. Well, this is an old instruction .... It has been completely
altered. Senator Proxmire. When was this revised? Mr. Burge. Within
the past year, Senator. [emphasis added]. Hearings, at 184.
114. Credit Ratings, 24 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-85 (1955) (enacted in 1910); 115
CONG. REc. S1163, 1166 (Jan. 31, 1969).
115. The original versions of the California legislation were initially introduced
in the 1969 Regular Session. See note 1, supra.
116. A.B. 149, CAL.. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
The Consumer Credit Reporting Act, CAL. STATS. 1970, Chapter 1348, and the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. STATS. 1970, Chapter 1550, were enacted
during the 1970 Regular Session and both enact sections 1750, et seq., of the
Civil Code. The two Acts are not in substantive conflict, however, and
both will be placed in the Civil Code, distinguished by their chapter numbers.
An amendatory bill will undoubtedly be introduced during the 1971 Regular
Session and the code section number of one of the two Acts changed.
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years of study, this Act has been the subject of much compromise, and
modification. 117  As a final product, it is a welcome boon to con-
sumer's rights.
The Act was originally introduced in the 1969 Regular Session but
failed to pass due to strong opposition from credit rating agencies, in-
surance companies, and financial instiutions.11 As introduced during
the 1969 session 19 the bill was considerably different than the Con-
sumer Credit Reporting Act of 1970.120 The 1969 version merely at-
tempted to provide California consumers with certain rights regarding
their credit files. Its original form may best be summarized as an attempt
to establish that consumers should be afforded due process with re-
gard to denial of credit and information pertaining to their credit file.
When reintroduced during the 1970 session the bill took the form
identical to its predecessor of 1969.121 By June 30, 1970, however, the
bill had changed drastically.122 The original version had been entirely
replaced by the present Act,123 which provided that consumers have the
right to assure the correctness of credit information pertaining to them.
It also enacted specific procedures for correcting that information when
it is discovered to be incorrect.
The Consumer Credit Reporting Act is still designed to provide con-
sumers with due process safeguards in the assimilation and dissemi-
nation of information pertaining to their credit standing. To implement
these safeguards the designated procedures are directed first at the
credit grantors. If a consumer is denied credit based upon an unfav-
orable credit report, the credit grantor must notify the concerned con-
sumer of this fact.124  If the consumer feels that such a denial is un-
justified, the burden of taking further action is then upon him. He has
sixty days in which to file a written request with the credit grantor re-
questing the identity of the credit rating agency that released the unfav-
orable report.' 25 The consumer may then by mail,12 telephone, 127 or in
person, 128 demand disclosure by the credit agency of the "nature and
substance of all information . . . on the applicant," the sources of the
117. Interview with Mr. Robert White, Administrative Assistant to Assemblyman
Pete Wilson in Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
118. Id.
119. A.B. 985, 1969 Regular Session, as introduced, March 17, 1969.
120. A.B. 149, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
121. A.B. 149, as introduced, January 12, 1970.
122. A.B. 149, as amended, June 30, 1970.
123. Id.
124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1754, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
125. Id.
126. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1753(b) (3), CAL. STATS. c. 1348.
127. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1753(b) (2), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1753(b)(1), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
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information, and the identity of all recipients of the report during the
preceding six-month period.129
If the completeness or accuracy of any item of information in the
consumer's file is disputed, the credit rating agency is obligated to re-
investigate unless "it has reasonable grounds to believe that the dis-
pute. . . is frivolous or irrelevant."'130 It should be emphasized this pro-
vision relates to frivolous or irrelevant disputes. If the information is
incomplete or inaccurate, the credit rating agency must correct it or de-
lete it even though the information may not have been used in any credit
rating report within the preceding six-month period.
If the credit rating agency does reinvestigate the disputed information
and still cannot reach an agreement with the consumer, the Act pro-
vides that the consumer may file a brief statement setting forth his ver-
sion of the dispute. 1' If the consumer elects to file such a statement,
the credit rating agency is then obligated to note that the item of in-
formation is the subject of a dispute between it and the consumer when-
ever it uses that information in subsequent reports.'132  In addition, the
credit rating agency is obligated to inform the consumer that he has
the privilege to have his statement sent to any specifically designated
credit grantor who has, within the preceding six-month period, received
the disputed information. 133
Finally, the Act provides that when the credit report concerns only the
consumer's ability to pay, his habit of payment, or his general credit
standing, the civil and criminal remedies ordinarily available to con-
sumers are limited to cases of willful misrepresentation. 134  If an in-
complete or inaccurate credit report that does not fall within one of
these three areas is communicated to a credit grantor, the ordinary civil
remedies are obviously available; however, the practicability of this
conclusion is insignificant when the phrase "general credit standing"
is considered. It is difficult to conceive of any credit report that will
not relate in some way to the consumer's "general credit standing."
Hence the language in this section of the act seems to effectively bar
most of the previously existent remedies.
The importance of this Act, in spite of its effect on judicial
remedies, is beyond question. The Act provides the type of relief most
fTequenfly needed by consumers; a more immediate and expeditious
129. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1752(a), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1755(a), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
131. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1755(b), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
132. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1755(c), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
133. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1755(d), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1756, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348.
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process that will allow the consumer to correct errors and obtain
credit when he needs it rather than face a protracted litigation where an
ultimate remedy may be very costly and uncertain. The Consumer
Credit Reporting Act procedures, by providing the consumer with
notice when a credit report is the basis for refusal of credit, and imposing
a duty on the credit reporting agency to respond to the consumer's
complaints is a major advance in that direction-but that is not to
say that it is as clear or as complete as it should be. For example, one
provision in the Act in need of clarification is the definition of "cred-
itor.' 135  The administrative assistant to the author of the Act ex-
plained in an interview that it was introduced in order to correct abuses
occasioned by retail credit reports. The coverage of this propos-
al, as he understood it, was limited to retail credit rating reports
alone. 136 The validity of his understanding is supported when consid-
ering the definition of "applicant", the individual to whom the Act was
intended to benefit. Section 1751 of the Civil Code, added by the Act,
defines applicant as a natural person who has made application to a
creditor for extension of credit for personal, family or household pur-
poses. The section also defines the term "Commercial Creditor" as a
person or entity which extends credit for purposes other than personal,
family or household purposes. Hence a Commercial Creditor is dis-
tinguished in order to limit the meaning of creditor under the Act.
Commercial Creditor is nowhere else mentioned in the Act.
The application of this Act is of critical importance to the consumer,
for today most credit files are generally all inclusive of any information
obtained on a consumer.lar The problem that is presented by this lim-
ited applicability goes to the very purpose for the introduction of the Act.
The measure was introduced because the author's constituents were
having problems getting their credit files corrected. 36  The types of
credit files that are in existence creating problems for consumers
throughout the nation today, however, are far from limited to appli-
cations for retail credit. Indeed, retail credit reports may be the most
innocuous of the three principal categories. If a consumer has been
denied retail credit because of an erroneous credit file he is inconven-
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751(d), CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1348, defines "creditor" as
".. a person or entity which extends credit for personal, family or household purposes."
136. Interview with Mr. Robert White, Administrative Assistant to Assemblyman
Pete Wilson in Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
137. Interview with Mr. Charles J. Benson, Vice-President, Credit Bureau Metro,
Inc. of San Francisco, California, August 12, 1970. Typically a consumer's file is a
"general inclusion" file. Such a file may be defined as a single file that contains
information derived from investigations made for the extension of retail, personnel,
and insurance credit.
138. Interview with Mr. Robert White, Administrative Assistant to Assemblyman
Pete Wilson in Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
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ienced and embarrassed. If a consumer is denied employment or in-
surance because of false information relating to a credit report he may
suffer a measurable harm. Consequently, despite the fact that the Con-
sumer Credit Reporting Act is an important innovation in the field of
consumer protection it may be totally inadequate as a solution to credit
reporting control in California.
The Consumer Credit Reporting Act was not the only credit rating
legislation that was discussed during the 1970 session of the California
Legislature. There were two other proposals which, had they passed,
would have added significant dimensions to the consumer's arsenal of
remedies.
One of the proposals was Assembly Bill 799.139 The general pur-
pose behind this bill was to provide express notice on all credit applica-
tions informing the applicant as to whether or not the information sup-
plied would be made available to third parties. 140 The provisions of
this bill would seem of little significance since they merely require no-
tice of disclosure of the information to third parties. However, some
lobbyists felt the ramifications of the bill were serious and managed to
maneuver its death in less than four months time.
Assembly Bill 2367 was the third proposal introduced into the 1970
Regular Session of the California Legislature relating to the credit rating
industry.141  This proposal was very broad, including articles defining
the rights of consumers, and creating a board to regulate all credit rat-
ing agencies in California. 142
The purpose of Articles 1 and 2 of this measure was to establish statu-
139. ASSEMBLY WEEKLY HISTORY, February 19, 1970, at 128. This bill was
introduced in response to a request by the Teamsters Union, but unfortunately it failed
to receive sufficient votes to pass out of committee. Interview with William Campbell,
Assemblyman for the 50th Assembly District, in Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
140. The face of every application form used on or after the effective date of
this section for consumer credit shall indicate in eight-point bold type
whether or not information offered by the customer will be made available to
any person other than the creditor.
A.B. 799, 1970 Regular Session, § 1921.
141. ASSEMBLY WEEKLY HIsToRY, April 3, 1970, at 358. This bill was originally
introduced into the 1969 Regular Session but strong opposition from the credit rating
industry and insurance companies caused it to be defeated. Interview with Mr. James
Reed, Senior Counsel to Assemblyman James A. Hayes in Sacramento, California,
July 8, 1970. As introduced in 1969, and 1970, A.B. 2367 was to apply to agencies
that reported insurance credit, personnel histories, and retail credit ratings. However,
due to strong opposition the author found it necessary, as a matter of strategy, to
delete insurance and personnel reporting from the scope of the bill. Interview with
Mr. Lionel Wilson, Staff Assistant to the Judiciary Committee of the California State
Assembly, in Sacramento, California, July 8, 1970.
142. A.B. 2367, Article 3 contains provisions for the creation of a regulatory
board in the Department of Consumer Affairs. The strongest objections to enactment
of this bill grew out of the author's refusal to delete Article 3. Interview with Mr.
John Hapgood, Manager, Retailers Credit Association of Sacramento, California, Au-
gust 10, 1970.
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tory rights for consumers and to delineate procedures for the fulfillment
of those rights. These procedures, encompassing the due process con-
cepts of the Consumer Credit Reporting Act, went further by establish-
ing time limitations for the use of certain kinds of information. Be-
cause of its unprecedented scope this proposal is important and its pro-
visions warrant detailed analysis. One proposed section required a con-
tract between the agency and the subscriber.143 The importance of this
requirement is that it would compel credit grantors to promise to use the
privilege of credit information only for bona fide credit purposes." If
the credit grantor abuses this privilege the credit rating agency would be
obligated to discontinue service.' 45  The contract would also obligate the
credit grantor to disclose to the consumer the identity of the credit rat-
ing agency that issued the report resulting in the denial of credit. 40
The consumer would then have the opportunity to require disclosure by
the agency of its information and the agency would be required to coop-
erate in correcting errors or misinformation.
A second section of A.B. 2367, similar to the provisions of A.B. 149
would have obligated credit rating agencies to negotiate controver-
sies with consumers.' 47  The consumer would have had the burden of
bringing the question to the attention of the credit rating agency. Once
this was done, however, the agency would be required to reinvestigate
any disputed items and update any necessary records at its own ex-
pense.' 48  The burden of updating its own records is not an unreason-
143. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, § 9883.2(a).
144. Id.
Credit Reporting organizations shall require service contracts in which the
regular subscriber or the occasional user must certify each of the following:
(1) That inquiries will be made only for the purposes of credit granting or
other bona fide business transactions.(2) That the consumer will be provided with the name and address of the
credit reporting organization from which it obtained any report that lead to
the refusal of credit.
145. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, § 9883.2(b), says:
The credit reporting organization shall refuse service to any prospective sub-
scriber or user who will not so certify, and shall discontinue service to any
subscriber or user who fails to comply with the certification required by sub-
division (a).
146. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, § 9883.2(a)(2). This provision pur-
ported to achieve the same result that was achieved by A.B. 149-namely to give the
consumer notice of a possible reason for a denial of credit so that he could have an
opportunity to correct any errors in his file if he wished to do so.
147. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, as amended June 24, 1970, § 9883.
148. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, § 9883(c), states:
When the consumer has had an application for credit rejected in whole or in
part, or when the charge for such credit is increased, because of a credit re-
porting organization report, the credit reporting organization shall make any
necessary reinvestigation and perform any necessary updating of records, in-
cluding public record, at no cost to the consumer for the interview or for the
reinvestigation. In the case of a consumer who has not been refused credit,
if a reinvestigation of certain items is requested, a modest fee not exceeding
the cost of a revised report may be charged.
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able duty to place upon the credit rating industry. In fact, most agencies
now perform this task at no expense to consumers. 149 However, to force
the credit rating industry to correct public records solely at their expense
is unreasonable.
Another important provision of this legislative proposal is a clause
which defines the relationship between credit rating agencies and
governmental agencies.' 50 Identifying information is made available
to any type of governmental agency, and any or all of the information in
the consumer's file may be supplied to such agencies; however, if the
governmental agency is a non-credit grantor, it must resort to legal
process in order to avail itself of anything more than identifying infor-
mation. As previously mentioned, this is an important provision, be-
cause agencies such as the F.B.I. and the I.R.S. frequently use credit
rating files. 15' Practices such as these raise strong questions relating
to the consumer's right to privacy. 152  Therefore, it is important that
this kind of regulation be added to the statutory scheme of consumer pro-
tection.
As mentioned above, this proposal also provided for time limitations
on the use of items of public record. 53 The need for this type of limita-
tion is important, for under present procedures judgments and tax liens
that are not immediately satisfied are usually noted in the consumer's
credit file. The situation then frequently arises where the consumer sat-
isfies these legal responsibilities but finds the disposition of the matter
was not included in his credit file. The result is that the consumer is
plagued by the repercussions from this incomplete information for an
indeterminable period of time.
A.B. 2367 also carried a specific provision to establish procedures for
the consumer to follow if he was unable to correct errors with the coop-
eration of the credit rating agency. It would have obligated the agency
to:
149. Interview with Mr. Charles J. Benson, Vice President, Credit Bureau Metro,
Inc., of San Francisco, California, on August 12, 1970.
150. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, § 9883.1, provided:(a) Identifying information, such as names, addresses, former addresses, and
places of employment or former employment, in the file of a credit reporting
organization may be supplied to any governmental agency under contract for
purposes other than evaluation of credit.
(b) Any other information in the file of the credit reporting organization
shall be supplied to credit-granting governmental subscribers and occasional
users while evaluating credit applications. Other governmental subscribers and
occasional users may obtain such information only in response to legal process.
151. Snyder, Do Credit Bureaus Know Too Much About You? PARADE, Novem-
ber 3, 1968, at 11.
152. See text at note 73 supra. These practices certainly seem to be un-justifiable intrusions into the consumers "right to be let alone."
153. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, as amended June 24, 1970, § 9883.5.
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(a) Delete any inaccurate or unverifiable information.
(b) Plainly mark the item as disputed...
(c) Permit the consumer to file a statement containing his version
of the dispute.
(d) Send a copy of such statement to all previous recipients...
identified by the consumer or by the records of the credit reporting
organization.
(e) Include such statement in all subsequent reports.154
There is evidence to indicate that the majority of the credit rating
agencies are now utilizing most of these procedures in their dealings
with consumers. 155 The only step that probably would be objectionable
to a reasonable California credit rating agency is the provision that ob-
ligates the agency to send a ". . . copy of such statement to all pre-
vious recipients . . . identified by . . . the records of the credit re-
porting organization.' 1 56  Literally interpreted, this clause would obli-
gate the agency to send a copy of the consumer's statement to all pre-
vious recipients of the credit report even though many of the recipients
would have no present interest in the revision. Though this provision
is in some ways meritorious, it should be modified to require only that:
(1) all recipients within the preceding twelve-month period, or (2)
any creditor designated by the consumer who has, within the preceding
twenty-four month period, received a credit rating on the consumer be-
fore it would warrant inclusion in the present law.15 It is admitted that
this proposal differs markedly from the statutory procedures announced
in section 1755 (d) of the Consumer Credit Reporting Act. However, it
is felt that a limitation of only six-months is far too short a period to ad-
equately guard consumer's rights.
CONCLUSION
In one form or another, all of the previously illustrated abuses occur
in most, if not all, of the credit rating agencies throughout the United
States. Such an indictment, on first impression, undoubtedly has the
effect of creating the impression the credit rating industry has no regard
for the rights of consumers. Such impressions should be avoided, how-
154. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, as amended June 24, 1970, § 9883.8.
155. Interview with Mr. Charles J. Benson, Vice-President, Credit Bureau Metro,
Inc., of San Francisco, California, August 12, 1970.
156. A.B. 2367, 1970 Regular Session, as amended June 24, 1970, § 9883.8(d).
157. The time limit enunciated by the Consumer Credit Reporting Act and by
most legislative proposals is six months. No justification for this specific limitation has
been uncovered, however, and it can only be assumed that the persons drafting the
legislative proposals arbitrarily decided that this period was a reasonable compromise.
Such a short period of time does raise doubts, however, that it is adequate to correct the
abused rights of innocent consumers. A period of twenty-four months appears to be a
more reasonable limitation.
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ever. In reality the evidence shows that the great majority of the abuses
are not occasioned through the evil intent or intentional inadvertance of
the industry. Rather, the great majority of the enumerated abuses are the
type that arise simply from the normal operation of the present pro-
cedures. The apparent answer to this need appears to lie in the crea-
tion of acknowledged rights for consumers and delineated responsibili-
ties for credit rating organizations. Toward this desired end, there-
fore, the following model statute is respectfully submitted as an amend-
ment to the Consumer Credit Reporting Act:
1. (a) (Reporters) shall require service contracts in which the
(creditor) must certify each of the following:
(1) That inquiries will be made only for the purposes of (granting)
credit or other bona fide business transactions.
(2) That the (applicant) will be provided with the name and
address of the (reporter) from which it obtained any report that
lead to the refusal of credit.
(b) The (reporter) shall refuse service to any prospective (credi-
tor) who will not so certify, and shall discontinue service to any
(creditor) who fails to comply with the certification required by
subdivision (a).
2. The face of every application form used .. for consumer credit
shall indicate in eight-point bold type whether or not information of-
fered by the applicant will be made available to any person other
than the creditor.
3. No (reporter) shall require a consumer to grant immunity from
legal action to the (reporter) or its sources of information, as a con-
dition for obtaining access to his own credit report.
4. (a) Identifying information, such as names, addresses, former
addresses, and places of employment or former employment, in the
file of a (reporter) may be supplied to any governmental agency
under contract for purposes other than evaluation of credit.
(b) Any other information in the file of (a reporter) shall be
supplied to credit granting governmental subscribers for purposes
of . . . evaluating credit applications. Other governmental sub-
scribers. . . may obtain such information only in response to legal
process.
5. (a) A (reporter) shall report bankruptcies of all types for not
longer than 10 years from the date of adjudication of the most re-
cent bankruptcy.
(b) A (reporter) shall report records of accounts placed for collec-
tion and records of accounts charged to profit and loss for not
longer than five years, or until the governing statute of limitations
has expired, whichever is shorter.
(c) A (reporter) shall report suits and judgments for not longer
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than five years from date of entry, or until the governing statute
of limitations has expired, whichever is shorter.
A (reporter) shall report paid tax liens for not longer than five
years.
(d) A (reporter) shall report records of arrest, indictment, or con-
viction of crimes for not longer than five years from the date of re-
lease or parole. Such items shall no longer be reported if at any
time it is learned that in the case of a conviction a full pardon has
been granted, or in the case of an arrest or indictment, a convic-
tion did not result.
(e) A (reporter) may report any other adverse data not other-
wise specified in this section for not longer than five years.
6. California Civil Code section 1755(d) is amended to read: Fol-
lowing any deletion of information which is found to be inaccurate
or whose accuracy can no longer be verified or any notation as to
disputed information, the reporter shall, at the request of the appli-
cant, furnish notification that the item has been deleted or the state-
ment, codification or summary pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c) to
any creditor specifically designated by the applicant who has within
twenty-four months prior thereto received a report for credit pur-
poses which contained the deleted or disputed information. The
reporter shall disclose to the applicant his rights to make such a re-
quest. Such disclosure shall be made at or prior to the time the in-
formation is deleted or the applicant's statement regarding the dis-
puted information is received.
James E. Clark
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